The Torah demands we do much to help others. However, while we may have to love others like ourselves, there is no requirement to love them more than ourselves. Thus if one who were to lose an object worth $5 would not find it worthwhile to spend any time trying to find it, one need not spend any time to return a $5 object to someone else. Determining when we might spend the time recovering an object will depend on my opportunity cost – that is, not only the cost of returning the object but what money I could be earning if I did not have to spend time returning the item. A professional who may be charging $300 an hour (or more) is not going to spend hours searching for an item even if it may be worth many hundreds of dollars. It makes little sense to require Reuven to forego $1,000 to return Shimon’s item worth $500[1]. However, someone unemployed may devote hours for an item worth just a few dollars.
Economics is not the only factor to consider in determining whether one needs to return a lost object. An even greater concern is human dignity, and one need not compromise one’s dignity to return a lost object. The disgrace involved may be such that it is a universal exemption – there is no need to sift through garbage to get to a lost object. At the same time our Sages understood that what is dignified for one may not be for another. They thus created a category of “an elder” where the definition of dignity would have a higher threshold exempting them even if others would be obligated to return a lost object. A similar calculus exists regarding the mitzva to help another carry his load[2].
The Gemara relates that Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rav Yossi, despite his age and position, both spent money and exerted much effort in order to help some nameless person shlep wood. Others including the owner of the wood could easily have done so themselves but it was Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rav Yossi who did so. While he was exempt, he did so as an act of lifnim meshurat hadin, going beyond the letter of the law.
That this concept is rooted in the Biblical ethos may be seen by the fact that the Gemara immediately brings a proof text to the concept of lifnim meshurat hadin. “’And you shall show them the path that they should walk and actions that they should do’ (Shemot 18:20)…’that they should do’ – this refers to lifnim meshurat hadin” (Bava Metzia 30b). And while an extralegal concept, its importance is such that “Rav Yochanan said: Jerusalem was destroyed only because… they established the law according to Torah law and they did not act lifnim meshurat hadin!” (Bava Metzia 30b)
While an individual is within his legal rights to act within the letter of the law a society is doomed to destruction if all take this approach. Always demanding what is one’s legal right is a recipe for disaster.
Tosafot wonders what happened to the more well-known teaching that the Temple was destroyed due to sina’at chinam (Yoma 9b) and answers that it was the combination of not acting lifnim meshurat hadin and sina’at chinam that led to the destruction.
At the same time it appears that these two concepts are flip sides of the same coin. Sina’at chinam does not primarily mean baseless hatred. Rather sina’ah is much better translated as apathy, being unconcerned for the welfare of others. It is the opposite of veahavta lere’acha kamocha where ahava means not so much love but care and concern.
Law, by definition, must be fixed and inflexible. As such, and due to the fluidity of life, there are times - rare perhaps but still all too plenty - when the law will be unfair to someone. Therefore we must act lifnim, before, the shurat hadin, the straightness of the law. We must get out in front of the law before it inflicts a possible injustice.
Torah law, even as given by the Divine Lawgiver can only cover so much and go so far. G-d in creating an incomplete world left it up to us to do the rest, to act lifnim meshurat hadin when needed. To paraphrase Rav Kook, Jerusalem was destroyed because we insisted on the letter of the law, and it will be rebuilt through acting beyond the letter of the law[3].
[1] This is in contradistinction to the mitzva of kibbud Av vEim which, while requiring no financial outlay is a service obligation – requiring time commitment despite the opportunity cost involved. Thus a child would be obligated to miss work to help his parents despite the (passive) loss of income this may involve. Regarding hashavat aveidah there is another mitigating factor; while I may not be able to afford the time to return the lost object presumably the next passerby or the one after that will be able to do so.
[2] Tellingly our Sages had no such concern for dignity when it came to earning a living. “Flee carcasses in the marketplace” or “make your Shabbat like a weekday” rather than ask for charity are the teachings of the Sages. Or perhaps we should argue that here too they had great concern for human dignity; there is little less dignified than asking for a handout for food.
[3] Please G-d we will have the opportunity to discuss some specific details, expectations and limitations of the concept of lifnim meshurat hadin when one of its most famous cases arises in some 50 pages or so.
