




HERMENEUTICS IN THE THOUGHT OF RABBI SOLOVEITCHIK— MEDIUM OR MESSAGE?

Author(s): Pinchas Hacohen Peli

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Dr. Peli is Norbert Blechner Professor of Jewish Thought and Literature, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel. His latest book is *Torah Today: A Renewed Encounter with Scripture*. His "Repentant Man—A High Level in Rabbi Soloveitchik's Typology of Man" appeared in *Tradition*, Summer 1980.

HERMENEUTICS IN THE THOUGHT OF RABBI SOLOVEITCHIK— MEDIUM OR MESSAGE?

I

Two characteristics stand out in the presentations of Rabbi Joseph Baer Soloveitchik: typology and hermeneutics (*derush*). Both of these are, apparently, matters of form. But are they really? In this case, as in the case of all true creative endeavor, it seems very difficult to distinguish between form and content.

Typology, the first of the characteristics, namely, the creation of *ideal* types in man and in society, and placing them in confrontation with their corresponding *real* types, has been dealt with by almost all students of R. Soloveitchik's thought. R. Soloveitchik himself, in his first published philosophical essay in 1944, defines and delineates this typological approach. When he deals with "The Man of Halakha" he bases himself upon Eduard Springer¹ and says: "Obviously, the description of the Man of Halakha refers to a purely ideal type, similar to other types studied by social scientists. Real men of Halakha, who are not simple but rather compound types, approach the ideal *Ish ha-Halakha* in greater or lesser degree, depending upon their social features and spiritual stature." R. Soloveitchik repeats this definition twenty years later in "The Lonely Man of Faith,"² where he states that, in actuality, pure typological specimens do not exist and therefore there is sometimes an overlap between two types of personality or community.

Despite these limitations of definition, he does not refrain from structuring his thought around an entire galaxy of typical "Men": Man of Halakha,³ Man of Knowledge,⁴ Man of Religion,⁵ Man of

God,⁶ Mystical Man,⁷ The Lonely Man of Faith,⁸ Adam I as the Man of Majesty, Adam II as the Man of the Covenant,⁹ all the way to the “Man of Repentance,” who is not actually nominated as such by R. Soloveitchik himself, but who does emerge as a specific compound figure from the chapters of *On Repentance*, based on his oral discourses.¹⁰

Whereas several students and critics of the thought of R. Soloveitchik have referred to this intellectual typology and the problems arising from it,¹¹ such is not the case with the second conspicuous feature of his thought, the use of the Midrashic method, which has yet to be studied and clarified. The clarification of this question can help us to understand R. Soloveitchik’s thought more fully, and to place it properly, despite its external wrappings, within the matrix of contemporary universal religious thought, as well as in its particularly Jewish context.¹² It is to this task that we shall address ourselves.

We shall exclude from our discussion those “sermons” of a popular-publicistic nature which R. Soloveitchik has delivered upon specific occasions. These cannot be integrated into the totality of his thought, as expressed in the remainder of his work, even though certain aspects of his thought processes can be discerned in them.¹³ It is clear that in these sermons, the *derush* is primarily directed towards the rhetorical effect upon his immediate audience.

What Nathan Rotenstreich has written with regard to this kind of preaching, in which Biblical heroes are conceptualized as “homiletic archetypes,”¹⁴ applies as well to these sermons of R. Soloveitchik, which should be counted among the best in Zionist homiletic literature. But they contribute little of substance to the body of his thought, the thought of a great, if not the greatest, modern Halakhist. This body of thought, in our opinion, constitutes a complete and systematic theologico-philosophical framework, even if not offered to us as such. Thus, it is neither the Midrashic achievement nor the immediate effect which are paramount, but the construction of a system of thought, independent and original, dealing with God, World, Community and Individual. This system is consistent and comprehensible in terms of objective tools of comprehension, combined with implications for personal subjective existence. And so the question returns to its starting point: how important is hermeneutics (*derush*) to this original and autonomous thought?

II

In order to answer this question we must examine the nature of *derush*, as an overall term inclusive of hermeneutics in all its aspects,

such as comes to us from the Jewish sources.¹⁵ These sources constitute the primary resources for R. Soloveitchik, though clearly his output is not of exclusively Jewish interest, but belongs to the general context of modern thought about God, Man, and the World.

Let us begin with the most recent generations, from which R. Soloveitchik proceeds, though as we shall see, he is anchored in all the ages of Jewish thought. "There is no doubt," writes Prof. Yosef Dan in his essay on the Jewish hermeneutics and its literary values,¹⁶ "that in the quantitative sense, the literature of *derush* is central in the life of the Jewish people during the Middle Ages and the beginning of the modern period. Only the Halakhic literature exceeds it in historical continuity in the history of Jewish literature, as well as in the quantity of the creativity it embraces. . . . This literature is a universal phenomenon in Judaism: there is not one Jewish community in which the *derush* literature is not a central element of its overall literary product." Yet, "despite its central position," complains Dan, "there is no literature in the history of Jewish literature so neglected by research."

Similarly, Avraham Kariv writes:¹⁷ "There is no branch in the tree of Jewish culture that the 'enlightened' among us belittle as much as homiletics. The very concept '*derush*' has become a synonym for lack of taste and meaninglessness, and yet this attitude is really a deliberate blindness to a powerful source of emotional and spiritual experience in Israel, and a gross ingratitude towards those many and varied preachers who graced our people with this gift called *derush*. *Derush* is a legitimate field of creativity in Judaism, a broad field, fruitful and thriving, as well as a powerful channel of influence upon the life of our people, vital and indispensable."

We have not cited these words in order to defend the honor of the literature of *derush* in recent generations, but to show that it constitutes an accepted and legitimate form of literary expression, which is the very least that emerges from the attempts to define and appreciate it as a specific literary genre in the Middle Ages and the early modern period. In truth it must be said that *derush*, both as method and manner of expression, as well as a *substantive* component in Jewish creativity in Halakha and Aggada at once, must not be limited to these periods alone. Its sources are ancient, and it is as old as Jewish creativity itself. *Derush*, in the sense of hermeneutics, is the spinal cord of classical Jewish thought from its beginning—appearing in Scripture itself¹⁸—up to our own day. In its most recent form, in the Middle Ages and the modern period, *derush* follows in the footsteps of Midrash, and is but its later incarnation. In structure and form it possesses its own recognizable features. Yet it is identical, or almost identical, in its essence, with Midrash, in that it constitutes

an autonomous tool of expression, faithful to the internal development of creative thought.

In his voluminous book on Jewish preaching,¹⁹ Rabbi Simon Glikberg “proves” with charming naiveté that the first preachers were none other than the Patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, followed by Moses and Aaron, on and on down to the Maggid of Kelm and the preachers of our day. However reluctant we may be to accept Rabbi Glikberg’s ingenuous “proofs,” the spirit of his simplistic argumentation we can accept, that in *derush* we have uninterrupted continuity of Jewish creativity, spreading over many fields—Halakha and poetry, history and exegesis—and in no smaller measure, thought and philosophy. In the former we refer primarily to *internal* Jewish speculation in confrontation with and in reaction to threatening existential situations; and in the latter, to confrontation with and reaction to *external* trends and philosophical schools.

Already in the earlier and later Midrash of the Sages there is a persistent struggle with internal problems as well as with philosophical opinions on the outside, usually without identifying the latter by name. Echoes of Stoic philosophy, Platonism, and the school of Pythagoras reach us via the “implications” of many Talmudic sayings, even if not in what is explicitly said, as proven by contemporary scholars of Talmudic thought, most notably by Prof. E. E. Urbach in his *Beliefs and Doctrines of the Sages*²⁰ and Prof. Abraham Joshua Heschel in his *Torah min ha-Shamayim*.²¹ In a broader and more open fashion than that of the Rabbis, Philo of Alexandria struggles with the opposition. His work embodies a meeting point between Judaism and Hellenism. The common element of *derush* in all its manifestations is that it appears as defender in the breach in these confrontations. At times it rejects the opposing viewpoints that attempt to infiltrate from the outside, and at other times it serves as a mediator, recommending the selective adoption of external ideologies by means of the homiletic method. In this manner the method sometimes becomes the very substance of the conscious effort to measure up to external doctrines, and the requisite tool for effecting their legitimate entry into Jewish life.

Such absorption is possible for a Judaism faithful to the tradition of prior generations only by the use of *derush*. When interpretation is strictly literal, collision is unavoidable. Only *derush* smooths out the rough spots; it alone permits opposites to co-exist. Only through *derush* can doctrines and opinions be formulated and constituted, and laws and customs be established.²² If it is indeed so powerful, it is no longer only a method, but a factor in the growth of Jewish thought through the generations. This growth is nurtured by two sources: inner flow and contact with external worlds of thought.

There are powerful connections between the newer literature of *derush* and the Midrash which preceded it, both in form and in content. Even if it be a new creation of the new era, it is identical to the old in the functions it assumes. The literature of *derush* emerged on the heels of the trauma caused by philosophy in the Jewish culture of the Middle Ages. The view of Harry Austryn Wolfson²³ that Philo was the father of Jewish philosophy in the Middle Ages is strengthened by the similarity of background between him and that of medieval Jewish philosophy, in that in both cases we see a confrontation between the internal culture and the external culture, without either one being ready to retreat from the arena, or to accept second place. The earliest practitioners of *derush* in the 12th and 13th centuries, R. Abraham bar Hiyya (*Meditations of the Sad Soul*), Nahmanides (Sermon for Rosh ha-Shana and Other Sermons), R. Jacob Anatoli (*Teacher of the Students*), and R. Bahya ibn Asher (*Cask of Flour*), employ *derush* to confront Torah with the principles of Aristotelian logic and metaphysics.

In a similar way at a later time, in the era of the expulsion from Spain, we have the sermons of Rabbenu Nissim and R. Yitshak Arama's impressive homiletics work, *Akedat Yitshak*. And from there to the 16th and 17th centuries, when we become witness to a direct influence of the culture of the Renaissance, as we find in R. Judah Moscatti (*Nefutsot Yehuda*), whose sermons are a mosaic of musical themes, astronomy, philosophy and Italian intermingled with the words of the Sages. To these must be added the "militant" preachers—the carriers of the gospel of the "new" to the Jewish world in various generations, up to the wandering Maggidim, the "oppositionist intelligentsia" which was instrumental, in the opinion of Joseph Weiss,²⁴ in spreading Hasidism in the 18th century. There were also those preachers who expressed opposition to Hasidism,²⁵ bringing us to the 19th and 20th centuries in which appear the great orators²⁶ in the cause of Zion, and opposed to them the carriers of the banner of Reform, which placed great importance on the art of preaching, and gave the title of "preacher" to the rabbi. The latter movement promoted the sermon as the unifying factor between past and present, as the ideology which presented the fundamental essence of Midrash, that the new is not new at all, but the old appearing in a new revelation.²⁷ *Derush*, then, is not a passive partner, but a creative force. It is not a mere method, but a clear and definite substance. This is true of the first philosopher-preacher in Judaism, Philo of Alexandria, and then, crossing over centuries and continents, of Rabbi Loewe of Prague,²⁸ up to Samson Raphael Hirsch in Frankfurt, Germany²⁹—and from him to Rabbi Joseph Baer Soloveitchik.

Side by side with the long and honored tradition of intellectual *derush*, another type of *derush* developed, born as a literary form, motivated by a desire for beauty and artistic playfulness for their own sakes, at times serving as illustration and “intellectual adornment.” The distinction must always be drawn between these two types, even though the line of differentiation is not always clear and they sometimes overlap. Thus, Maimonides was able to discern in some Aggadic passages matters of indifferent value, not leading “either to fear or love,”³⁰ while the Sages see in the Aggada the means to “recognize the One who spoke and thus created the world,”³¹ that is, solid theological themes containing fundamentals of the faith.

Thus it is clearly wrong to wrap all preachers and all sermons into one package. Maimonides knows well how to recognize the kind of *derush* which is mere method, thereby constituting a dangerous and revolutionary tool, invalid in supporting or rejecting specific doctrines. “Know that our rejection of the theory of the eternity of the universe is not based on passages in the Torah which speak of the creation of the world, for these verses are not any more conclusive concerning creation than are the verses which imply corporeal aspects in divinity. *The gates of interpretation are not closed to us* in the matter of creation; we could interpret them, as we have done in the matter of the negation of anthropomorphism. In fact, the former would perhaps be simpler for us, since we could easily interpret the verses in question in a manner which would permit the assumption of the eternity of the universe, as we have interpreted verses in order to nullify the concept of a corporeal divinity.”³² Thus in Maimonides’ opinion, any doctrine, even that of “the eternity of the universe” which is in fundamental opposition to the principles of the Torah faith, could have been reconciled through *derush* interpretation, for “the gates of interpretation are not closed to us.” From the above we should be able to appreciate the absolute refusal to utilize Aggada and *derush* for the purposes of confirmation or refutation of any particular doctrine. There is no limit to the ability of *derush* to “reconcile” verses for its own purposes. Hence its power is perilous and its usefulness negligible.

All this is true only as long as we speak of *derush* as method, not when it is part of the substance of the matter. In the first case we attempt to “resolve” the contradictions between the verses and their strange content, and *derush* is supposed to serve as some kind of bridge across the abyss that remains after we have tried to span the gaps between the separate worlds. Not so in the second case, in which *derush* is part of the substance. Then, the doctrines which had appeared to be foreign enter into the precincts of the sacred, become naturalized, established within it, and internally blended, so that the

process can be considered as *creative hermeneutics*. This process does not bridge or bind two entities but melts them both down, drawing forth from the cauldron a new creation, complete and synthesized.

I. Heinemann in *Darkhei ha-Aggada* sees two basic guidelines in the creation of Midrash.³³ One, "creative philology," runs as a continuous thread through all of the literature of *derush*. It appears also in the guise of creative etymology,³⁴ in which each word, every added and subtracted element in the Biblical text, serves as a jumping-off point for fruitful, imaginative creativity. The second is "creative historiography" in which the preacher not only broadens and adds color, names and details to the development of the nucleus of Biblical historical narrative, but also nourishes it from his own resources of meditation and personal experience. However, there is still another line of creative *derush* in which the preacher transports himself, with all his thoughts, beliefs and traits, into the Biblical situation or into the person of the Biblical hero, out of complete empathetic identification. In this situation he seeks to discover himself, without severing his ties to his own time and place.

In most cases, we would find the stimulus for this emanating from an immanent tension, whose source lies in a conscious or unconscious striving for an internal spiritual synthesis of distant, true worlds, struggling within the mind and heart of the preacher-philosopher. To be explicit: we are speaking of a synthesis which leads to unified existence, not a resignation to co-existence in the style of "Torah" with "*Derekh Erets*," or "Religion" and "Science."³⁵

The two truths coming into dialectic confrontation here do not follow one another in succession, or at the expense of each other—but they are simultaneous, both of them constituting, as it were, one single truth, though at first glance they seem to be not only separate but contradictory. They must be one because they have to dwell within the soul of one man, for whom they assert laws of life, in theory and in practice, and do not remain within the walls of the academy. *Derush*, here, is not an adornment but a primary, essential condition of life.

III

This kind of hermeneutics, flowing from a concrete dialectical existential situation, is the philosophical *derush* of Rabbi Soloveitchik. It arises predominantly from the existential necessity of a new reality, one which, though still striving for self-definition, can only be denied or doubted today with great difficulty. Rabbi Soloveitchik himself is an exemplary representative of this reality.

What we have in mind is the new situation, in which Halakha, in the sense of a full life of Torah and Commandments, now shares a home with the fullness of Western culture. In this home we meet the Westernized Jew, whose belonging to Western culture is not marginal, derivative or partial, but complete, natural and autonomous. At the same time this very person is also a Jew of the Halakha, for whom Halakha is not trivial, a nostalgic vestige, an emblem of ethnic identity, but deeply rooted, profound and all-embracing. Both Western culture and the Torah of Israel are natural truths for him, self-evident; in both does he see a way of life for himself and for the community in which he lives. He does not seek to blur contradictions and cover up the gaps between the two, immanent gaps of which he is quite aware, but which do not deter him or confront him with the necessity to choose between them. He is aware of the tension created by these gaps, this tension itself adding depth and breadth to his existence, fructifying his creative powers, and sharpening his sensations and reactions to the two centers of influence to which he is exposed, not by compulsion but by free choice and recognition of the rightness and worthwhileness of that choice.

Rabbi Soloveitchik represents this Jew, and in his effort to serve as his spokesman, *derush* serves him as a means of passage from one of these poles to the other, enabling him to proceed securely in that one world located within these poles. When he interprets the written sources he is not aiming to “solve” difficulties or give answers in the case of verses that appear to contradict his philosophical thesis; rather, the verses themselves are made to propound that very thesis. The philosophical conception and the Biblical passages, and even more surprisingly the essentials of Halakha, themselves become spokesmen of the socio-philosophical reality in which he finds himself, while this very same reality on its part, as distant as it seems, actually embraces at many points the Halakhic approach and Biblical personalities. The problem is not fundamentally, as it often was in the confrontation between Judaism and forces external to it, one of “verses” standing in contradiction to each other. For Rabbi Soloveitchik it is clear that often verses *do* stand in contradiction, but he accepts axiomatically that a third, reconciling source is available. The tension between the two cultures in which he functions and creates is not destructive, corrupting and shattering, but, on the contrary, constructive, positive, fruitful and creative. Biblical passages and Halakhic rulings are not road hazards for him, but traffic signs offering him direction. He brings them together and, as it were, touches them with the magic hand of *derush*. They become “swallowed up” into the meditative-experiential framework he fashions before us, and are set within it as precious jewels. Verses and laws are

not foreign transplants which have to be uprooted and replanted, but part of the original intellectual and spiritual landscape. They themselves form the language in which R. Soloveitchik expresses his ideas, even if it does not require any special effort to recognize traces of great contemporary thinkers, most of whom certainly were unaware of and did not recognize at all the interpretation of the passages, to say nothing of the Halakhic ambience.

If language be part of the very substance of philosophic thought or personal experience, when the attempt is made to transmit these to others, certainly *derush* in the service of Rabbi Soloveitchik is such a substantive element, and not merely an external, methodological means.

This close integration between modern Western thought and traditional Jewish modes of expression, as found in the thought of R. Soloveitchik—what we have called the *derush* method—is not accidental and is also not a matter of personal style. It is a necessary result of the historical-spiritual situation referred to above. This situation is different from the one formulated by the great neo-Orthodox thinker Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch in the slogan “Torah and *Derekh Erets*.” There Torah and the ways of the world remain separate entities, existing side by side without contact, except that they are embodied in the same person at different times. The situation we speak of is also different from that of the “Renaissance of the Sacred” as propounded by the school of Rav Kook, which seeks to sanctify the new and discern the revelation of the sacred in the development of science, in evolution, and in human progress. In the new situation addressed by Rabbi Soloveitchik, we find ourselves equidistant from, or in equal measure within, two specific worlds, standing in mutual opposition, the holy and the profane. There is no attempt here to secularize the holy or to sanctify the secular. The two worlds exist and persist in their own right, and we live and persist in both of them. In the ladder of priorities both of them together are preferred, with all of the paradoxes and contradictions this involves. This world is aware of its innate contradictions, and the tension produced by them, but they do not lead to hostility and a perpetual state of war. There may not be complete peace between them, but there undoubtedly exists a truce between the armed forces on both sides. The world of Halakha as it emerges from the situation in which R. Soloveitchik finds himself is mature enough to confront its internal and external enemies. The world beyond the walls no longer tempts and mesmerizes as it did, precisely because *I am already in it and know it*. Winds blowing outside no longer carry everything away and remove everyone from the house of study; the light coming from the outside has lost the power to draw everything to it.

The world of those who observe Halakha and live according to it on a daily basis has emerged from the *shtetl*, has burst through the walls of the ghetto, and in the process has not thrown the *tallit* and the *tefillin* overboard. The world of Halakha still sets the Jew apart, but this isolation is a proud one, not a shameful ghetto. The world of Halakha is now legitimate, socially accepted, even cosmopolitan.³⁶ It is now possible to observe the strictest standards of *kashrut* on all international flights. It is quite respectable to order kosher meals in many exclusive hotels all over the world, or to inquire of the man at the front desk about the availability of a *minyán*. Torah and *mitsvot* actually exist in theory and practice in exclusive atomic laboratories, in hospitals, in industrial and commercial centers. All this requires a more sophisticated approach to the understanding of Halakha, and certainly for the purpose of explaining it to others. The old apologetics must now arm itself with more up-to-date weapons, in order to be heard in the higher, contemporaneous levels of society.

Contact between the world of Halakha and that of secular Western culture is not merely social and external but occurs in basic spiritual terms, in education, entertainment, and in establishing esthetic standards and world views. Jews who are faithful to every iota of Halakhic requirement grow up and are directly fashioned by Western culture. For them it is not an external attainment but internally substantive, autonomous, and a spiritual component with which one has to live. Halakha in its new incarnation, after passing through the tortures and indignities of its inner and outer critics, is not content to be a matter of blind habit, royal decrees, and the like, but demands together with other disciplines the status of intellectual legitimacy and a defensible position. The separation between Torah and *Derekh Erets*, which worked in its time for the Jews of Germany, no longer suffices for the new-Orthodox Jews of America. The two domains forcibly interest each other and are compelled to co-exist in time and thought.

IV

This reality is confronted in the thought given to us by the mouth or pen of Rabbi Soloveitchik, and includes *derush* as an integral part of it, so much so that it is difficult to describe it otherwise. True, the thought is Halakhic thought, but as Rotenstreich³⁷ has pointed out so well, Halakha here is not a restricted, specific law, but a matter of anthropology and phenomenology.

From the viewpoint of historical precedent, it seems that what is closest to (although chronologically furthest from) this method of

almost complete assimilation of an external culture into established Jewish contents, is Philo of Alexandria in his many-sided literary activity. In this case, it is the Stoic allegory which was “Judaized.” This comparison is not accidental. Taking into consideration all the many and profound differences between R. Soloveitchik and Philo, there remains a great measure of similarity between Alexandria of the first century and Boston of the twentieth century. Rav Soloveitchik differs from Philo in his breadth of knowledge of Judaism and in his deep connection to Halakha, but it seems nevertheless permissible to say that in a certain sense he finds himself in a Philonic situation.

What are the salient features of this situation?

A. The Jewish community and Jewish thought are under the influence of a powerful outside cultural force, which is pagan, anti-Jewish, rejected fundamentally by the Jewish group, and yet is also possessed of an attractive intellectual and spiritual message, clothed in ethical and cogitative values that can easily be identified with ancient Jewish values.

B. There is an urgent need for high-level apologetics for internal and external purposes, which can justify the validity of the Jewish position, especially with regard to the necessity for the observance of the imperatives of Halakha, within a society and under conditions heretofore unknown. This function is doubly difficult as the Halakha comes under the fire of criticism from within and deliberate attempts to make it “adjust” and conform to social and cultural pressures of the environment (the old “Hellenizers” and modern Reform and Conservative groups).

C. The apologist holds a thorough and proud conviction of the superiority of Judaism, of Torah, *viz.* Halakha—which “will not be changed” even in view of the powerful external culture, for “it contains everything,” and nothing good, moral or true has been omitted from it if only one knows the way to search for it.

These are among the things that characterized the Philonic situation and gave rise to the allegoric interpretation of Scripture, which only recently has begun to gain the recognition it deserves. These and other similarities characterize the new situation in which Rav Soloveitchik functions. What allegory was for Philo, *derush* is for R. Soloveitchik.

However, unlike Philo’s, the goal of R. Soloveitchik is not one of interpretation (were we to assume that this was the goal of Philo³⁸), and he makes no pretense of presenting his Midrashim as the authoritative interpretations of Torah. And yet, like Philo, his goal is philosophic and didactic, so that the verses of Scripture (and for R. Soloveitchik also matters of Halakha) serve as the natural

means for him to express his thought, in which there is a synthesis of two distant worlds that have been brought close to each other.

If we were to extend this comparison further, we should substitute for the word “synthesis”—which has been worn out from excessive usage in recent generations—the word “syncretism.”³⁹ That is to say, a total and equal acceptance of both worlds, that of the Western-Humanistic and that of the Jewish-Halakhic, with all the imagined and real contradictions between them. This acceptance demands that we perceive the two worlds as one.

With R. Soloveitchik, as with Philo, we find ourselves both at the end of an old long road, and at the beginning of a new one. The meeting between Judaism and philosophy in ancient times was not sudden or of a one-time nature. It took place in several stages, “opening with mere philosophic adornment and wrapping of Jewish ideas, going through a process of introducing isolated ideas of Greek philosophy into Israel, up to the fundamental philosophic purification of Judaism performed by Philo.”⁴⁰ So Isaac Julius Guttman attests concerning Philo: “For him philosophy does not serve merely as a means for doctrinal affirmation, and the occupation with philosophic problems is not restricted to details, but he sees Judaism itself as a philosophic teaching, in the sense that it includes within itself a complete philosophic system. . . . With the help of the allegorical method of interpretation created in the Stoic school, he succeeds in dictating into the Five Books of Moses, both into its historical and its legal sections, philosophic content. He thoroughly believed that he was not budging from the ground of Judaism, but was only discovering its deepest meaning.”⁴¹

“The Torah of Moses,” continues Guttman,⁴² “is for him the complete truth, and contains all that science can possibly tell, and therefore, the nature of the allegoristic interpretation of Scripture is totally different from that of the allegoristic interpretation of the myths by the Stoic sages, his teachers and predecessors. He wanted to unite the two forms of truth, that of human cognition and that of divine revelation. The position of these two forms of truth together is possible only within the bounds of the religion of historical revelation, and Philo was the first to work diligently to unite them in a systematic fashion. When he was called the first theologian, the title fit him in this sense more than in any other. The manner of questioning later prevalent in theology and in the philosophy of the monotheistic religions, was already familiar to him, and this fact bestows upon him a historical value superior to the value of his thought itself.”

This is true also of R. Soloveitchik. He finds in Judaism, especially in Halakha, a total, unblocked view of the intellectual

world of modern Western man, as it is expressed in his philosophic, psychological, or sociological creations. The perspectives of man and world presented by the social sciences and contemporary society do not only not disturb the Halakhic view of man and the duties it thrusts upon him, but they are the very same perspectives, from a different point of view. This becomes possible only through the power of *derush* in service to, and under the aegis of, Rabbi Soloveitchik, not only as a methodological tool, and certainly not merely as a literary-esthetic technique, but as a substantive component which raises to realization that syncretic synthesis through which the Jew lives in Halakha and in time.

V

This phenomenon is clearly evident in many places in the writings of Rav Soloveitchik.⁴³ Suffice it for us to examine one essay, pregnant with practical implications, though it, too, like most of his writings, is based on an oral discourse. We refer to the essay “*Kol Dodi Dofek*.”⁴⁴ This essay is completely marked by the sign of *derush*, starting with its title, and, with its general literary framework, through the many double meanings and the plethora of brilliant Midrashic flashes spread throughout the length of the work, down to the powerful concluding chords—we have before us a profound and powerfully expressed literary-philosophic creation, which cannot be defined in any better way than to call it a *derasha*! Here is a perfect sermon, following all the prescribed rules, though it is not anchored in the classical era of *derush* literature, but is totally rooted in the time and place of its composer, our time. Moreover, the examination of the essay against the background of R. Soloveitchik’s other writings and lectures demonstrates that there is no room for any suspicion of deliberate imitation of the style of *derush*, be it in the pseudographic manner or by way of parody. So much for form.

What is important, however, is that every effort to trace the thought content of the essay—containing as it does very significant and weighty themes, as will be clear to anyone familiar with the rich religious thought that sprang up following the Holocaust and the Rebirth of Israel—will find the roots, trunks, and branches of these ideas also existing and maintaining themselves in the world of *derush*. Only in the “Midrashic reality” which tolerates paradoxes and sees things in their prospective and retrospective aspects simultaneously, can the words of Rabbi Soloveitchik on Holocaust and State be acceptable. This reality rescues the thought of Rabbi Soloveitchik from the one-dimensional historiosophic analysis repre-

sented so plentifully in the religious thought created in the wake of this complex and many-sided subject.⁴⁵

The essay "The Voice of My Beloved that Knocketh" begins with the ancient religious-philosophic problem of "the suffering of the righteous," in which Rabbi Soloveitchik sees "one of the sealed riddles with which Judaism has wrestled since its earliest days." According to him this is a problem that occupied all the prophets and which "still hovers over our world, demanding its solution: why does God permit evil to rule over creation?" The solution is, and he introduces it in a manner which would indicate much prior consideration, that it is possible to overcome the problem of suffering in the world, when we measure them in two separate dimensions: *fate* and *destiny*. "Judaism," he says (and it is interesting to test the meaning of this word in the subsequent discussion: Halakha? Aggada? Philosophy? Mysticism?), "always distinguished between existence in fate, and existence in destiny."⁴⁶

As for suffering in the dimension of "fateful existence"—it is a riddle and a painful one, agitating and paralyzing, and will ever remain such. Judaism, "with its realistic approach to man and his position in existence" is not ready to accept compromising metaphysical solutions which attempt to obscure the nature of evil. "Evil is an undeniable fact. There *is* evil, there *is* suffering, and there are the pains of hell in the world. He who desires to fool himself by removing his attention from the rent in existence, and by romanticizing the life of man, is but a fool and a dreamer of dreams."⁴⁷

However, in the second dimension of human existence, that of destiny, suffering becomes a challenge to man, calling him to a "face-to-face confrontation with evil."⁴⁸ This confrontation is not a matter of metaphysical speculation but is "Halakhic and ethical," in which the emphasis is shifted from the question of the cause of evil to the world of action. "The problem is now defined in the simple language of Halakha, and becomes relevant to daily practice. . . . What obligations does suffering place upon man?"

Halakha, Rabbi Soloveitchik establishes, is concerned with the question of evil and suffering "as in other questions of permitted and forbidden, obligation and release. We do not speculate about the inscrutable ways of God, but on the way in which man should walk when suffering befalls him . . . and the Halakhic response to this question is very simple."

R. Soloveitchik emphasizes again and again that we are faced here with a Halakhic question, that Halakha provides an answer for it. Yet, is "the Halakhic answer to this question very simple" in reality? What really is "a Halakhic answer"? Is it to be understood in the limited sense of an answer to be followed in practice? Moreover,

is it indeed “very simple” to arrive at this answer? So does Rabbi Soloveitchik rule, and no one will question his position as master of the Halakha. And what is, according to him, the Halakhic answer? “Suffering is intended to elevate man, to purify him and sanctify him, to clean his thoughts and cleanse them from all superficial dross and gross sentiments, to refine his character and broaden the horizons of his life.” All these does he include in what he calls “a Halakhic answer”! And if that were not enough, he supplements the answer and provides us with “the sum of the matter: the function of suffering is to mend the flaw in the character of man”! And again in the same vein: “Halakha teaches us that it is a crime on the part of the sufferer to permit his anguish to *go to waste* and to remain without meaning and goal. For suffering appears in the world in order to contribute something to man, to atone for him, to redeem him from corruption, vulgarity and a sunken spirit.” These are parts of the “Halakhic answer,” and what is the first Biblical source quoted in support of this “Halakhic ruling”? “‘It is a time of travail for Jacob, and from it he shall be saved’—that is, from the *travail itself* the salvation will come.” The source of the “Halakha” is then obvious Midrashic novelty, and immediately following is a second Midrash, similar to the first: “‘When it is painful for you, when all these things befall you . . . thou shalt return unto the Lord thy God’—suffering obliges man to indulge in perfect repentance before God.” Following this Midrash there is a long discussion based on Halakhic rulings by Maimonides which stress the tie between trouble and repentance, and are most appropriate for our purposes here. And then, we go on: “Judaism has deepened this concept (of the improvement of man through suffering) by associating the idea of rectifying suffering with rectifying grace.”⁴⁹ And here he floats far over the waves of the sea of Jewish mysticism to the world of rectification (*tikkun*), both of suffering and of grace, which demand improvement in man. And again, a proof text, apparently Halakhic, but in reality thoroughly in the nature of *derush*: “Our great teachers have taught us that ‘a man must bless for evil as he blessed for good.’ Just as the good obliges man to engage in elevated action, and demands of the individual or the community creative action and renewal (a nice *derush*, but not the simple meaning, of ‘to bless’), so does suffering demand improvement of the soul and purification of life . . . in short, it is not man’s obligation to solve the problem of rational cause or purpose of suffering in all its speculative complexity, but [his concern is] the question of their amelioration in all its Halakhic simplicity, by converting [mere] fate into [meaningful] destiny.”⁵⁰

Thus even a cursory reading of a passage in “*Kol Dodi Dofek*” compels us to recognize this vital methodological and substantive

element in the creativity of Rabbi Soloveitchik, as it finds expression in this essay and as it does in his other writings: the concept “Halakha” is continually broadened under his touch to include a philosophical approach.⁵¹ The justification of this broadening lies in the power of *derush*, which makes it possible to widen and materialize the concept “Halakha” until it embraces philosophic-existential fundamentals, together with prominent terms from the area of kabbala and mysticism.

True, the position of Rabbi Soloveitchik in all that relates to the comprehension of “evil” which is expressed in the Holocaust, and the “grace” that is expressed in the historical events (“the calling of the beloved”) that are tied up with the rise of the State of Israel, constitutes a “Halakhic” approach, that is, an approach that is concerned with real daily existence, and in the obligations that this existence thrusts upon man, and not with metaphysical prophecy beyond this world. And yet, the foundations of this “Halakha” lean upon the pillars of *derush*, as a result of which, through the enthusiasm engendered by the conception of these matters and their transmission, this “Halakha” is enabled to pose as the totality of the Jewish scheme of things, as it has been formulated in the modes of practical law, and yet not losing the blazing, living flame which glows in the inner recesses of this practice, from Sinai up to now. R. Soloveitchik represents the “Man of Halakha”—but this “Halakha” of which he speaks must not be grasped in terms of the four frozen ells; it includes the world and all that is in it, and man together with all his profundities and orbits. These are revealed to us when this “Halakha” is interpreted in the accepted manner of *derush* over the generations. If we can be permitted a farfetched analogy, we could say that the works of Rabbi Soloveitchik are not a “Mishnah” which contains here and there (as in the *Mishneh Torah* of Maimonides) Aggadic material of an expository and embellishing nature,⁵² but a kind of “Midrash Halakha” in which Halakha and Aggada are blended. In this manner, R. Soloveitchik himself passes from his positioning of himself “Halakhically” in the matter of evil in the world, expressing the existential obligation towards deeds that carry the force of legal rulings, for the purpose of “rectifying suffering and elevating it”—over to complete formulations, organized statements, or marvelous gems of *derush*, which wander in refrain from subject to subject and from image to image. And the leading image that emerges before us is Job.⁵³

The image and events of Job are interpreted to exemplify the thesis that there is no sense in speculation about the nature of suffering. Only after Job is convinced and says: “Therefore do I speak without understanding what is too wonderful for me, and

which I know not,” only then does God reveal to him “the true, hidden basis of suffering as it is formulated by the Halakha”! Job never knew the cause or the purpose of suffering, but one thing it is his obligation to know: “the basis of remedial suffering.” And here R. Soloveitchik constructs a marvelous Midrashic scheme of Job’s situation, which appears at one and the same time in all the various Aggadic-Midrashic eras in which Job lived and functioned. In the manner of Midrash, he pays no attention to the real gap separating the time of Jacob the Patriarch from the time of the return to Zion in the days of Ezra, all the times coalescing for him into one time.⁵⁴ The man Job who lived as well in the time of Jacob, the time of the exodus from Egypt, and the time of the return to Zion, he and his pains are woven together in the web of *derush*, which speculates on the nature of Jewish prayer conceived of as public prayer, and on the connection between individual and communal responsibility when the individual is the subject of either a time of grace or a time of suffering. And from here, after Soloveitchik has leaped to the wide expanses of hermeneutics that develop around the figure of Job, he returns to the Halakhic question: “What is the duty of suffering man that arises out of his suffering? What heavenly commanding voice pierces through the veil of pain?” What are “the laws of the remedying of evil” or “the law of rectifying pain” that we derive from Job? In a broader sense: What is the “Halakha” we learn from the “echo of the imperative that drives relentlessly upward” out of the event? This Halakha depends on the manner in which we employ the method of *derush* concerning the special happening occurring in history, in order to derive from it the meta-historical “imperative” of the Halakhic principle whose source is godly, and which must be embodied as “Halakha” within history.

VI

In order to arrive at this compound conception with regard to the historical events of our epoch, centered in the Holocaust and the reestablishment of the State, R. Soloveitchik has need of the classic tools of *derush*, and he creates several new Midrashim for the Scriptural verses, especially for the Song of Songs, from which the name of the essay is taken.⁵⁵ From these Midrashim there emerge for us Halakhic imperatives of a meta-historical nature, which we are commanded to fulfill within historical Halakhic reality.

Before us, in “*Kol Dodi Dofek*,” is one example of this type of Halakhic Midrash in our day, formed against the background of the historical events of the last generation. Its starting point is the terrible

historical hardship in which the people of Israel were placed after the Holocaust. The Halakha which emerged from this reality was the meta-historical command not to miss the opportunity. The principle according to which this “Halakha” was specified flows from the world of Halakha which stipulates in many cases the prohibition against missing opportunities, and functions out of a keen sense of time in such matters as the desecration of the Sabbath (one moment—permitted, one moment later—prohibited) the time of the reading of *Shema*, etc.⁵⁶ The path leading from the meta-historical imperative to its fulfillment in the historical situation is the path of *derush*.

A commandment which is not fulfilled in time can destroy worlds. To illustrate this Halakhic principle R. Soloveitchik creates several Midrashim. Here, for example, is a new and moving Midrash dealing with the stories of the sins of Saul and David.⁵⁷ While the confession of the latter is accepted and his sin forgiven, that of the former is not accepted because he missed the correct moment, and his kingdom is taken from him. And here is a second Midrash, which serves as the main framework for the essay as a whole and which concentrates upon the image of the Shulamit maiden, and the description of “the tragic and paradoxical hesitation of the beloved, intoxicated with love and nostalgic dreams” who misses the opportunity “of which she dreamed and for which she had fought, and which she sought with all her heart’s enthusiasm,” so that she does not respond to the knocking of the beloved, who also is very desirous of her. This Midrash upon the Song of Songs created by Rabbi Soloveitchik was not created but to permit us to conceive the meaning of the historical events of the Holocaust and the State, their meta-historical significance and the Halakhic imperative that emerges from them.

What is the rise of the State of Israel to Rabbi Soloveitchik? Is it the redemption, or one of its stages? Is it the beginning of redemption? The beginning of the growth of our redemption? Indifferent and unconnected to the course of redemption? False messianism? Satanic?⁵⁸

Rabbi Soloveitchik has prepared us in the preface to his discourse on the conception of the events which led to the rise of the Jewish state, not to ask for the nature of the matter in the metaphysical sense, but for the Halakhic imperative which is evoked by it. What then is this command coming to us from meta-history and how does it reach us? R. Soloveitchik refrains from responding with definite answers to this question, as would be expected of him as the *Ish ha-Halakha*. For example, he does not rule whether it is obligatory, permitted, or prohibited to recite *Hallel* on *Yom ha-*

Atsma'ut. Instead he fortifies himself behind the exalted, mystic Biblical text from the Song of Songs, and by means of *derush* brings forth the “beloved” who knocks on the door of the “friend” entering the specific historical situation which he is dealing with, and this situation itself heralds the Halakha that emerges from it.

“Eight years ago, in the midst of a frightening night, full of the horrors of Majdanek, Treblinka and Buchenwald, in a night of gas chambers and crematoria, in a night of absolute hiding-of-the-face . . . in a night of unceasing searchings for the beloved—in this very night the beloved arose and appeared. The God who was hiding in his hidden pavilion suddenly appeared and began to knock at the entrance to the tent of the bedraggled and bereaved companion, restlessly tossing on her bed in heaving and tortures of hell. *It is because of the rapping and knocking at the door of the companion, wrapped in grief, that the State of Israel was born!*”⁵⁹

“The knocking of the beloved” is spelled out by R. Soloveitchik in terms of six calls. They result from a hermeneutic development of words and situations taken from the Song of Songs. Are these “knocks” miraculous, outside the bounds of nature, justifying desertion of established Halakhic systems? Or are they merely natural developments? Using the *derush* form helps Soloveitchik avoid these explicit issues. So, for example, is described the “first knock”: “. . . from the viewpoint of international relations no one will deny that the rise of the State of Israel in the political sense was almost supernatural.” Notice: “almost” supernatural. Nevertheless, he continues: “I do not know whom the representatives of the press saw, with their eyes of flesh, sitting upon the presiding chair in that fateful meeting (of the General Assembly) in which it was decided to found the State of Israel, but he who looked well with his spiritual eyes felt that the real chairman presiding over the discussion was—the beloved. He was knocking with his gavel upon the table.”⁶⁰ And this is called “almost supernatural”?

Rabbi Soloveitchik struggles with this matter and here, too, *derush* comes to his aid. “Do we not interpret the verse in the Book of Esther, ‘That night the king could not sleep’ as referring to the sleep of the king of the universe?”⁶¹ If only Ahashverosh could not sleep, it would not have been important at all and no salvation would have come that night, but if the king of the universe, as it were, could not, or did not sleep—why, then the redemption is born. If so-and-so had opened that meeting of the United Nations the State of Israel would not have been born, but if the beloved raps upon the presiding chair—the wonder takes place. The voice of the beloved knocks.”

The way of *derush*, which can move from the Song of Songs to the Book of Esther, affords Soloveitchik the paradoxical opportunity

to say and not to say what he wants to say and does not want to say. In all of the Book of Esther the name of God is not mentioned, and yet Halakha demands of us to pray for and praise “the miracles” of Purim.

And so with regard to other “knockings.” They float on the border between the natural and the supernatural. We cannot, we may not, speculate about the precise metaphysical whatness of those knockings that are expressed in the breathtaking happenings in the political, the military, the educational, and the interreligious spheres after years of the darkness of the hidden face.⁶² We should not look for one truth, cut and dried. We should be content with the Midrashic truth of the matter. What it is incumbent upon us to hear from the midst of the wonderful events occurring before our eyes, as a kind of raw material of *derush*, is a meta-historic imperative clothed in real historic Halakha, and in our case, the Halakha concerning the prohibition of missing the temporal opportunity in all that relates to the tension of support and assistance to the State of Israel.

The use of the *derush* of “the sound of the knocking of my beloved” is, as we have seen, substantive in the thought of Rabbi Soloveitchik and is not merely methodological. So it is with regard to the “six knockings” of the beloved, and so it is with regard to the distinction at which he arrives by way of a typical form of *derush*, which moves from subject to subject, until the solution to the entire matter is found—the distinction between the covenant at Sinai (the covenant of destiny) and the covenant of Egypt (the covenant of fate), and the difference between them. This distinction leads to other conceptual distinctions, such as between *Mahaneh* and *Eda*, “Nation” and “people,”⁶³ and “grace” and “holiness”—an entire universe of philosophic concepts, all of them rooted in the soil of *derush*, both as method and as substance.

NOTES

1. “*Ish ha-Halakha*,” published first in *Talpiot*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 5704 (1943), and now in: Rabbi Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, *Be-Sod ha-Yahid ve-ha-Yahad* (In Aloneness, In Togetherness), a selection of Hebrew writings edited by Pinchas Peli, Jerusalem, 1978; in the latter, p. 39, note 1. The essay also appears in *Ish ha-Halakha—Galui ve-Nistar*, Jerusalem; 1979, and has been translated by Lawrence Kaplan in *Halakhic Man*, Philadelphia, 1983.
2. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, “The Lonely Man of Faith,” *Tradition*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer 1965, pp. 65–67.
3. See note 1 above and in *Be-Sod ha-Yahid ve-ha-Yahad*, pp. 137–188 (all the citations from “*Ish ha-Halakha*” below will refer to this book).
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 45, 55–63; 112.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 47–48; 84–94; 100.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 95–108.

8. See note 2 above.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 28, 33.
10. Pinchas H. Peli, *On Repentance: In the Thought and Oral Discourses of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik*, Orot Publishing House, Jerusalem, 1980, pp. 1–343. See especially the Introduction, pp. 117–54.
11. See Eugene B. Borowitz, *A New Jewish Theology in the Making*, Philadelphia, 1964, pp. 164–170, and Lawrence Kaplan, “The Religious Philosophy of Rabbi Soloveitchik,” *Tradition*, Vol. 14, No. 2, Fall 1973.
12. So writes Arnold Jacob Wolf on the universal significance of the thought of the Rav in a critical essay on *Al ha-Teshuva (On Repentance)* in the periodical *Sh'ma*, September 1975: “If I am not mistaken, people will still be reading him in a thousand years.”
13. Sermons such as were heard at Religious Zionists conventions in the United States appear in Yosef Dov Halevi Soloveitchik, *Hamesh Derashot (Five Sermons)*, translated by David Teltzner, Jerusalem 5734.
14. See Nathan Rotenstreich, *Studies in the Jewish Thought of Today (Iyyunim ba-Mahashava ha-Yehudit ba-Zeman ha-Zeh)*, Tel-Aviv, 1978, pp. 74–83.
15. For an overall review of the traditional Christian hermeneutical method, see *The New Hermeneutic*, ed. by James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, New York, 1964; also W. Parker, *Hermeneutics*, University of Chicago Press, 1978.
16. *Ha-Sifrut*, Tel Aviv, September 1972, Vol. 3, 3–4, pp. 550–567.
17. In the introduction to his book, *Shabbat u-Mo'ed ba-Derush u-va-Hasidut (Sabbath and Festival in Derush and Hasidism)*, Tel Aviv, 5726, p. 5.
18. See Y. L. Zunz, *Ha-Derashot be-Yisrael ve-Hishtalshelutan ha-Historit (Sermonics in Israel and their Historical Development)*, edited and completed by Hanokh Albeck, Jerusalem, 5707, chap. 3; and Hanokh Albeck, *Mavo la-Mishna (Introduction to the Mishna)*, Tel Aviv, 5719, pp. 3–10.
19. *Ha-Derasha be-Yisrael (The Sermon in Israel)*, a description of the Hebrew sermon and its development from ancient days up to the last period, by Rabbi Simeon Jacob Halevi Gliksberg, Tel Aviv, 5700, pp. 15–519. See also *Torat ha-Derasha (The Art of the Sermon)* by the same author, Tel Aviv, 5708, which is in the nature of a second part to *Ha-Derasha be-Yisrael*.
20. Ephraim E. Urbach, *Hazal: Pirkei Emunot ve-De'ot (The Sages: Faith and Doctrine)*, Jerusalem, 5729, chap. 1.
21. Abraham Joshua Heschel, *Torah min ha-Shamayim ba-Aspaklaria shel ha-Dorot (Torah from Heaven, in the Light of the Generations)*, Vol. 1, Jerusalem, 5722; Vol. 2, 5725.
22. Comp. Marvin Fox, “Judaism, Secularism and Textual Interpretation,” in the collection *Modern Jewish Ethics, Theory and Practice*, Ohio University Press, 1975. See also in that collection the article by Akiva Ernst Simon, “The Neighbor We Are Supposed to Love.” On Midrashic interpretation as a living source in Judaism, see the essay “Interpretation” by Simon Ravidovitz in *Studies in Jewish Thought*, pp. 62–84, Philadelphia, 1972.
23. Harry A. Wolfson, *Philo—Foundations of Jewish Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, Harvard University Press, 1947, Vol. 1, Introd. and p. 63 *et al.* Also in Vol. 2, p. 282.
24. Joseph Weiss, “*Reshit Tsemihatah shel ha-Derekh ha-Hasidit*, (The Beginning of the Hasidic Way),” *Zion*, Vol. 16 (5711), pp. 46–105.
25. See Mordechai Wilensky, *Hasidim u-Mitnaggedim—Le-Toledot ha-Pulmus she-beinehem bi-Shenot 5532–5575 (Hasidim and Their Opponents—a History of the Controversy Between Them During the Years of 5532–5575)*, Jerusalem, 5730.
26. Regarding the preachers for *Hibbat Zion*, see R. Schzipanski, “*Hogei ha-Ra'yon bi-Tekufat Hibbat Tsiyyon* (Thinkers in the *Hibbat Zion* Period),” in the collection *Hazon Torah ve-Tsiyyon (A Vision of Torah and Zion)*, ed. by Shimon Federbush, Jerusalem, 5720, p. 83. Comp. further *ha-Derasha be-Yisrael (The Sermon in Israel)*, *op. cit.*, p. 10, chaps. 57–60. Also, “*Ha-Metifim le-Hibbat Tsiyyon* (Preachers for *Hibbat Tsiyyon*),” in *Pa'amei ha-Ge'ula (Footsteps of Redemption)* by Aryeh Zanzifer, Tel Aviv, 5712.
27. According to H. H. Ben-Sasson, *Hebrew Encyclopedia*, Vol. 13, p. 219, entry “*Derasha*.” So also does Eduard Maybaum claim in a sermon for Passover in 1879: “For thirty years we have been accustomed to connect homiletically the exodus from Egypt with our current freedom; then we were aided by miracles, while today science is our salvation.”
28. Concerning the Maharal of Prague as a preacher who employed *derush* to react to the challenges of his day, see Andre Neher, *Le Puits de l'Exil, la theologie dialectique de Maral*

- de Prague*, Paris, 1966 and "Ha-Maharal mi-Prague ke-Humanist (The Maharal of Prague as a Humanist)" in the collection of articles *U-ve-kol Zot*, Jerusalem, 5738, pp. 161–177. Also see A. P. Kleinberger, *Ha-Mahashava ha-Pedagogit shel ha-Maharal mi-Prague (The Pedagogical Thought of the Maharal of Prague)*, Jerusalem, 5723; Benjamin Gross, *Netsah Yisrael: Hashkafato ha-Meshihit shel ha-Maharal mi-Prague al ha-Galut ve-ha-Ge'ula, (The Messianic Thought of the Maharal of Prague on Exile and Redemption)*, Tel Aviv, 5734.
29. See the selection of articles on Samson Raphael Hirsch and his special approach to interpretation and preaching in *Ha-Rav Shimshon Raphael Hirsch, Mishnato ve-Shitato (Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, His Doctrine and Approach)*, ed. Yonah Emanuel, Jerusalem, 5722.
30. The language of Maimonides in *Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim*, 12:2: "A person should not occupy himself with words of Aggada, and should not pause long over the Midrashim related in these and similar matters, and should not make them central—for they do not lead either to reverence or to love [of God]."
31. *Sifre, Ekev, Piska* 49 (Finkelstein edition, p. 115).
32. *Guide to the Perplexed*, Part II, chap. 25.
33. I. Heinemann, *Darkhei ha-Aggada (Ways of the Aggada)*, Jerusalem, 1970, chap. 1.
34. See Rabbi Issachar Yakobson, in his article *Kavvim Ahadim be-Perusho shel ha-Rav Shimshon Raphael Hirsch la-Torah (Some Reflections on Rabbi S. R. Hirsch's Interpretation of the Torah)*, in the anthology *Hirsch* (above note 28), p. 45, on "The Speculative Etymology" in the *derush* interpretation of Hirsch.
35. The first was in the style of Frankfurt neo-Orthodoxy, later incorporated in the version promoted by Yeshiva University in the neo-Orthodoxy of America. See S. Belkin, *Essays in Traditional Jewish Thought*, New York, 1956; also Norman Lamm, *Faith and Doubt*, New York, 1969.
36. For a description of the possible acceptance of the strict Orthodox observer of *mitsvot* in American-Western society, see, for example, Herman Wouk, *This Is My God*, New York, 1961.
37. See *Studies in Jewish Thought* (above note 13), pp. 61 ff.
38. See Wolfson (above note 22), Vol. 1, pp. 57 ff.
39. For the use of "syncretism" with respect to Philo, see David Rokeah, *Chapters of Philo* (Heb.), Jerusalem, 5736, p. 10.
40. Isaac Julius Guttman, *The Philosophies of Judaism* (Heb.), Jerusalem, 5711, pp. 25–26.
41. *Ibid.* pp. 28–29.
42. *Ibid.* pp. 32–33.
43. Examples of the use of *derush* by Rabbi Soloveitchik are numerous and varied. Not only passages of Bible and Halakha serve as material for *derush*, but even situations and times. Thus, the death of the Brisker Rav on Yom Kippur serves as a starting point for a typological distinction between "The Men of Rosh ha-Shana" and the "Men of Yom Kippur" (see *Be-Sod ha-Yahid ve-ha-Yahad*, in the chapter "Ma Dodekh mi-Dod"). A similar case is the basic typological distinction between two types of men, based on the interpretation of the passages which relate the story of the creation of man in the Book of Genesis; see "The Lonely Man of Faith" (above note 2) and many similar cases in *On Repentance* (for example, pp. 26–28, 21, 115; 58–60 and many more).
44. First published in the anthology *Torah u-Melukha (Torah and State)*, ed. Simon Federbush, Jerusalem, 5721. A note there (apparently written by R. Soloveitchik himself) states that the words had been delivered orally, at a gathering in celebration of Israel Independence Day, 5716. The essay was later published in abridged form and in full in many places, the latest being *Be-Sod ha-Yahid ve-ha-Yahad*, pp. 333–400.
45. One-sided historiosophic interpretation of the Holocaust and the Renaissance is presented in two diametrically opposed versions. On one side we have the works of Rabbi Joel Teitelbaum, the Satmar Rebbe, *Vayoel Moshe (And Moses Wished)*, New York, 5716, and *Al ha-Ge'ula ve-al ha-Temura (On Redemption and Change)*, Brooklyn, 5727; and of A. Gitlin (Uriel Zeimer), *Yahadut ha-Torah ve-ha-Medina (Torah Judaism and the State)*, Jerusalem, 5719. On the other side we have Rabbi D. Halevi, "Dat u-Medina (Religion and State)," Tel Aviv, 5729; Rabbi Y. Amital, *Ha-Ma'alot mi-Ma'amakim (Rising from the Depths)*, Alon Shevut, 5734; and the works of Rabbi Menahem M. Kasher: *ha-Tekufa ha-Gedola (The Great Period)*, Jerusalem 5729, and *Milhemet Yom ha-Kippurim (The Yom*

Kippur War), Jerusalem, 5734. So far we do not have a comprehensive study on the subject. Among the tentative overviews are Prof. Uriel Tal's "The Land and the State of Israel in Israel's Religious Life," in *Rabbinical Assembly Proceedings*, 1976; and Pinchas Peli's *Teguvot Datot la-Sho'a (Religious Reactions to the Holocaust)*, an anthology, Jerusalem, 5733, and "*Be-Hippus ahar Lashon Datit la-Sho'a* (In Search for Religious Language for the Holocaust)," in the annual *Jerusalem*, 5738, and in *Conservative Judaism*, Fall 1978, pp. 86–94.

46. *Be-Sod ha-Yahid ve-ha-Yahad*, p. 333.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 336.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 338.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 339.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 342.
51. On Halakha as a kind of phenomenology see Rotenstreich (above note 36) and comp. also David S. Shapiro, *Studies in Jewish Thought*, New York, 1972, pp. 112–120.
52. Especially in the concluding sections of the Tractates in Mishna, and the concluding Halakhot in *Mishneh Torah*, but not only there.
53. *Be-Sod ha-Yahid ve-ha-Yahad*, pp. 343–347, on the figure of Job as a classic model for *derush* and interpretation. See the anthology, *The Dimensions of Job*, ed. Nahum Glatzer, New York, 1969.
54. On the stretching of the time element as a Midrashic method, see I. Heinemann, *Darkhei ha-Aggada*, pp. 27 ff.
55. The Song of Songs serves as inspiration for the Midrashic ventures of Rabbi Soloveitchik in other places as well, such as in the late essay "*U-Vikkashtem mi-Sham* (Ye Shall Seek him from There)," *Hadarom* No. 47, Tishrei 5739.
56. On the categories of time as principles in the *a priori* world of the Man of Halakha, see "*Ish ha-Halakha*," pp. 70 ff.
57. *Be-Sod ha-Yahid ve-ha-Yahad*, pp. 350–351.
58. All these categories appear with reference to the Holocaust and the Renaissance in the literature of religious thought; see above, note 44.
59. *Be-Sod ha-Yahid ve-ha-Yahad*, p. 354.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 355.
61. A *derasha* found in the Talmud, *Megillah* 15b, on the verse in Esther 6:1.
62. Soloveitchik does not enter into the theological explanation of the "Hiding of the Face" that occurred during the Holocaust, which is dealt with by Martin Buber in "Eclipse of the Light of God" in *The Face of Man*, Jerusalem 5726, pp. 221 ff., and by Eliezer Berkovitz at length in his book, *Faith After the Holocaust*, New York, 1973, pp. 94 ff. Rather, he accepts it as self-evident.
63. *Be-Sod ha-Yahid ve-ha-Yahad*, pp. 364–366.